The role of guerrilla warfare used by the CCP in the Chinese civil war [1927-37 and 1946 – 49] was a key factor in the final defeat of the GMD.  In the period 1927-37, the first phase of the civil war, it was used to ensure that the communists survived.  Guerrilla warfare tactics were successful in defeating the first three GMD encirclement campaigns launched by Jiang Jieshi [leader of the GMD] to annihilate the CCP.  The GMD forces outnumbered the CCP considerably, with 100,000 troops deployed in the first campaign and then 200,00 and 300,000 in the second and third campaigns respectively.  Mao used guerilla units effectively drew out GMD groups deeper into the countryside and detached forces would be ambushed in surprise attacks.  Guerilla strategies were also used to defeat the GMD in the fourth encirclement campaign under the leadership of Zhu De.  However, when the strategy changed under the leadership of the 28 Bolsheviks for the Fifth Encirclement campaign the CCP faced total disaster.  Positional conventional warfare played into the strengths of the GMD, which had amassed 800,000 troops.  The GMD also benefitted from German military advisers.  The CCP only survived this last campaign by breaking out and embarking on what became known as the ‘Long March’ in October 1934.

Once again, after initial failures attempting to pursue conventional tactics against the GMD as the CCP retreated, the leadership decided to adopt guerrilla warfare.  To withstand the constant GMD assaults on their 9,600km trek across deeply inhospitable terrain the CCP used guerrilla strategy to ensure that its forces reached Yan’an.  Mao’s military strategy was accepted during the Long March at the Zunyi Conference in January 1935.  This also meant that Mao had become the de facto leader of the CCP.  The survivors of the Long March gained invaluable experience in fighting the GMD and deploying guerrilla tactics. 

After the Xi’an incident and the establishment of the Second United Front, the CCP continued to use guerrilla warfare as a means to wage war against the Japanese.  During the second Sino-Japanese war [1937-45] the strategy had many advantages as it was used effectively to protest peasants and villages from Japanese attack and it also was an excellent tool for propaganda as the CCP could claim that it was the real party taking on Japan.  Guerrilla warfare meant that the CCP incurred fewer casualties to the GMD who fought conventionally against Japan.  Indeed, the historian Immanuel Hsu argues that the outcome of the Chinese civil war was determined by the effects of the war against Japan.  Hsu believes that the war fundamentally weakened the GMD whilst strengthening the CCP. 

In the final phase of the Chinese civil war Mao once more used guerrilla warfare to bring about a communist victory.  The creation of the People’s Liberation Army in July 1946 formed a more sophisticated military force than the CCP had had before.  Through the use of guerrilla war the CCP were able to take back cities that had been taken by the GMD in Manchuria despite being outnumbered three to one by GMD forces.  Through 1947 and early 1948 GMD troops were cut off from supplies and isolated forces were relentlessly attacked by the PLA.  As the CCP strengthened in 1948 Mao was able to move towards a final conventional warfare strategy to finally defeat the GMD.  The CCP were able to launch offensive with heavy artillery and air cover and push the GMD out of Beijing and Tianjin in January 1949.  From these positions the CCP were able to take Shanghai in April and Mao declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949. 

However, the military strategy of guerrilla warfare was not the only factor that led to the communist victory in 1949.  The CCP also pursued successful political policies, and promoted an ideology of ‘national communism’ with a limited program of land reform.  This lead the CCP to have widespread peasant support – essential for waging an effective guerrilla war.  The implementation of moderate land reform, abolishing debt and easing the tax burden in the territories under its control galvanized this support.  Mao had also had a policy of only 10% commitment to fighting Japan during the Sino-Japanese War and focused on building bases and consolidating the CCP’s position.  Indeed, by March 1948 the CCP had been able to ‘liberate’ 700 towns as the people had supported them and wanted reform. 

In addition, it could be argued that the Chinese civil war was not essentially won by the CCP but rather lost by the failings and limitations of the GMD.  Jiang mismanaged the economy under his control and this led to inflation rising to 300% by 1943.  The impact of inflation and corruption on the GMD’s support base, the middle classes and business, meant that his supporters became disillusioned.  The military campaigns of the GMD were also poorly commanded, Jiang did not trust his generals so would never commit fully to any campaigns, whether this was against the CCP or against the Japanese.  His generals were indeed unreliable and due to CCP infiltration, for example his commander in Manchuria after 1946 was a CCP spy.  It was no surprise that the GMD were militarily defeated.

Finally, the role of foreign intervention in determining the outcome of the war should also be considered.  Aside from the military, political and economic policy strengths of the CCP and the military, economic and political limitations of the GMD the role of the US was key.  The US did give the GMD considerable assistance, $3 billion in aid for example, however it also cajoled Jiang to agree to ceasefires in 1946 and 1947 when the GMD had the upper hand in the war.  These enforced ceasefires allowed the CCP to recover and regroup and meant the GMD lost momentum.  In addition, the very fact that the US was supporting the GMD undermined the political credibility of Jiang’s government.  The CCP were able to present themselves as the true nationalists in China and not beholden to another western imperialist force.